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 1 
REMEDYING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CTBT? 
TESTING UNDER THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Remedying the Limitations of the CTBT 
CHRISTOPHER P EVANS* 
Various limitations on the testing of nuclear weapons already exist within international law, 
including the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water of 1963, along with further restrictions on where testing is permitted and the 
maximum yield of such tests. Yet it was not until 1996 that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (‘CTBT’) was adopted, representing the first globally reaching prohibition of all forms of 
testing that result in a nuclear weapon ‘explosion’. The CTBT does not, however, cover subcritical 
and computer simulated nuclear tests, which can ensure the safety and reliability of existing 
stockpiles, thus undermining the CTBT’s implications for nuclear disarmament. More importantly, 
due to the onerous entry-into-force requirements under art XIV, the CTBT is not yet binding on 
states and is unlikely to become so in the near future. A further contribution to the legal restrictions 
on nuclear weapon testing has recently been provided by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons (‘TPNW’), which was adopted in July 2017. Under art 1(1)(a), states party undertake 
never, under any circumstances, to ‘develop’ or ‘test’ nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. Given the challenges facing the CTBT, this article seeks to analyse the extent of the testing 
prohibition established under art 1(1)(a) as well as the scope of the prohibition of development in 
order to determine whether the TPNW closes the testing ‘loophole’ established by the CTBT by 
including subcritical and computer simulated testing within either of these prohibitions. The article 
will conclude by offering some thoughts on the TPNW’s prospects for entry into force and its future 
relationship with the CTBT. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The prohibition of nuclear weapon testing is an issue that states have been 
grappling with for decades. However, it was not until the adoption of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (‘CTBT’) in 1996 that an apparently 
‘comprehensive’ instrument prohibiting all forms of nuclear weapon test 
explosions was concluded.1 Yet, while many continue to endorse the CTBT as one 
of the most significant ‘effective measures’ towards nuclear disarmament pursuant 
to art VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (‘NPT’),2 
prospects for its entry into force continue to look bleak in light of the onerous 
requirements imposed by art XIV(1) of the CTBT. This is despite repeated 
resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly that have called 
upon states to ratify the CTBT as soon as possible.3 Moreover, the CTBT remains 
hindered by its failure to prohibit all variations of nuclear weapon testing activities, 
instead continuing to permit subcritical and computer simulated tests. These 
failures of the CTBT have remained largely unresolved over the past two decades, 
providing the nuclear weapon possessing states (‘NWPS’) with the ability to 
improve and ensure the reliability of existing stockpiles. 
Although the majority of states have refrained from conducting nuclear 
weapons tests following the negotiation of the CTBT, recent events have reiterated 
the urgency of achieving an implemented, legally binding prohibition on all 
nuclear weapon testing activities. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(‘DPRK’) has conducted six nuclear weapon explosive tests since 2006, the latest 
of which took place in September 2017.4 In May 2019, Lieutenant General Robert 
Ashley, Director of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency, claimed that 
Russia had ‘probably’ carried out extremely low-yield nuclear tests in its remote 
Novaya Zemlya Arctic testing facilities in violation of the CTBT, though no 
evidence to support such claims has been offered.5 More recently, in April 2020, 
 
 1 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, GA Res 50/245, UN GAOR, 50th sess, 125th plen 
mtg, Agenda Item 65, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/50/245 (17 September 1996) (‘Resolution 
50/245’), which adopted Letter Dated 22 August 1996 from the Permanent Representative of 
Australia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, 50th sess, Agenda Items 
8 and 65, UN Doc A/50/1027 (26 August 1996) annex (‘Draft Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty’) (‘CTBT’).  
 2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968, 
729 UNTS 161 (entered into force 5 March 1970) art VI (‘NPT’).  
 3 For the most recent of these, see Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, GA Res 74/78, 
UN GAOR, 74th sess, 46th plen mtg, Agenda Item 104, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/74/78 
(23 December 2019) para 6; Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, GA Res 73/86, 
UN GAOR, 73rd sess, 45th plen mtg, Agenda Item 107, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/73/86 
(14 December 2018) para 6 (‘Resolution 73/86’); Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 
GA Res 72/70, UN GAOR, 72nd sess, 62nd plen mtg, Agenda Item 105, Supp No 49, UN Doc 
A/RES/72/70 (13 December 2017) paras 6–7 (‘Resolution 72/70’). See also United Nations 
Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General’s Remarks at “Article XIV Conference” on the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty [as delivered]’ (Speech, Article XIV Conference, 
20 September 2017) <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-09-20/secretary-
generals-remarks-%E2%80%9Carticle-xiv-conference%E2%80%9D-comprehensive>, 
archived at <https://perma.cc/464S-4WHK>, again encouraging states to ratify the CTBT as 
soon as possible.  
 4 For a concise analysis of DPRK nuclear testing, see ‘Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: 
North Korea’, Arms Control Association (Fact Sheet, June 2018).  
 5 Daryl G Kimball, ‘US Claims of Illegal Russian Nuclear Testing: Myths, Realities, and Next 
Steps’ (Policy White Paper, Arms Control Association, 16 August 2019).  
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the US similarly claimed that China may have conducted secret low-yield tests at 
its Lop Nur test site, following increased excavation activities and the use of 
explosive containment chambers in 2019.6 In light of these accusations, and given 
the current trend of the US withdrawing from existing arms control arrangements 
such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,7 the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action8 and, most recently, the Treaty on Open Skies,9 it is not beyond the 
realm of possibility that the US may signal its intention not to ratify and no longer 
be bound by the CTBT.10 In fact, earlier this year in May 2020, US officials 
reportedly met to discuss the possibility of resuming nuclear testing, though it has 
been stressed that there has been no policy change as of yet.11 
However, it seems that all hope is not lost. On 7 July 2017, the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (‘TPNW’) was adopted at the United Nations 
Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear 
Weapons, Leading towards Their Total Elimination (‘2017 Negotiation 
Conference’).12 The Treaty represented the outcome of efforts coordinated by a 
committed group of non-aligned non-nuclear weapon states (‘NNWS’) and civil 
society activists, including the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize winner, the International 
 
 6 Michael R Gordon, ‘Possible Chinese Nuclear Testing Stirs US Concern’, The Wall Street 
Journal (online, 15 April 2020) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/possible-chinese-nuclear-
testing-stirs-u-s-concern-11586970435>, archived at <https://perma.cc/6TVY-R8DX>; 
United States Department of State, Executive Summary of Findings on Adherence to and 
Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and 
Commitments (Executive Summary, April 2020) 8.  
 7 Kingston Reif, ‘After the INF Treaty, What Is Next?’ (2019) 49(1) Arms Control Today 26; 
Michael R Pompeo, Secretary of State, ‘US Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 
2019’ (Press Statement, United States Department of State, 2 August 2019) 
<https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/3GA5-562V>.  
 8 Michael R Pompeo, Secretary of State (US), ‘On the Treaty on Open Skies’ (Press Release, 
United States Department of State, 21 May 2020) <https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-
open-skies/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/U2CR-8EWW>. See also Daniel H Joyner, ‘The 
United States’ “Withdrawal” from the Iran Nuclear Deal’, E-International Relations (online, 
21 August 2018) <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/08/21/the-united-states-withdrawal-from-the-
iran-nuclear-deal/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/X2NS-4S6U>.  
 9 John Hudson and Paul Sonne, ‘Trump Administration to Withdraw from Open Skies Treaty 
in a Further Erosion of Arms Control Pacts with Russia’, The Washington Post (online,  
22 May 2020) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/05/21/882d460a-
9b68-11ea-b60c-3be060a4f8e1_story.html>, archived at <https://perma.cc/M4XH-8K9Y>. 
 10 See, eg, Rebecca Johnson, ‘What to Look for in the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee’, 
European Leadership Network (Commentary, 23 April 2019) 
<https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/what-to-look-for-in-the-2019-
npt-preparatory-committee/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/N8E4-48QC>; Andreas Persbo, 
‘Will the Trump Administration’s Accusations Doom the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?’, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (online, 18 May 2020) <https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/ 
will-the-trump-administrations-accusations-doom-the-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/8MEE-JQHD>. 
 11 Julian Borger, ‘US Security Officials “Considered Return to Nuclear Testing” after 28-Year 
Hiatus’, The Guardian (online, 23 May 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/
may/23/us-security-officials-considered-return-to-nuclear-testing-after-28-year-hiatus>, 
archived at <https://perma.cc/4RTD-2E3M>; Aaron Mehta, ‘Live Nuclear Testing Could 
Resume in “Months” if Needed, Official Says’, Defense News (online, 26 May 2020) 
<https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2020/05/26/live-nuclear-testing-could-
resume-in-months-if-needed-official-says/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/J5W6-2E83>. 
 12 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Agenda Item 9, UN Doc A/CONF.229/2017/8 
(7 July 2017) (‘TPNW’).  
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Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (‘ICAN’).13 The principal objective of the 
humanitarian initiative, the group of non-nuclear weapons states and civil society 
actors behind the TPNW,14 was to prohibit all aspects of nuclear weapons due to 
the ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’ resulting from their use, and, as 
such, the adoption of the prohibition treaty would constitute an ‘effective measure’ 
towards the objective of nuclear disarmament.15 Given the challenges facing the 
CTBT, this article seeks to determine whether the undertaking never to ‘test’ or 
‘develop’ nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices under art 1(1)(a) of 
the TPNW addresses existing ‘loopholes’ within the CTBT’s prohibitions, and 
aims to offer some insights on the TPNW’s prospects for entry into force and its 
future relationship with the CTBT.16 
This article proceeds as follows. Following the introduction in Part I, Part II 
offers a brief overview of the fragmented regulation of nuclear weapon testing 
implemented prior to the adoption of the CTBT. Part III is then dedicated to a more 
exclusive analysis of the CTBT, focusing on precisely identifying the testing 
prohibitions under art I(1). This section will also note the CTBT verification 
framework and highlight the challenging entry-into-force requirements imposed 
by art IX(3). Part IV then provides a brief account of the TPNW’s history and 
negotiation to shed light on the underlying interest and motivations that informed 
the adoption of the Treaty. 
Following this preliminary discussion, Part V analyses the scope of the testing 
prohibition established under art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW. This will provide an 
examination of the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘test’, ‘nuclear weapon’ and 
‘other nuclear explosive devices’ in the TPNW’s context and in light of its object 
and purpose, as well as investigating the travaux préparatoires to support the 
interpretation reached. Part VI will then explore an alternative means of 
incorporating non-explosive testing activities under the TPNW through the broader 
prohibition on ‘developing’ nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
As will be shown, it is the latter prohibition related to development that best 
captures non-explosive testing activities. Finally, Part VII discusses some 
prospects for the TPNW moving forward, particularly its potential for early entry 
into force, and the future relationship and compatibility of both the TPNW and the 
CTBT in light of the broader scope of testing prohibitions established by the new 
instrument. 
Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. This article does not intend to touch 
upon the critical discussion of whether a parallel comprehensive prohibition of 
nuclear weapons exists under customary international law. Although it is generally 
 
 13 ‘ICAN Receives 2017 Nobel Peace Prize’, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear 
Weapons (Web Page, 22 December 2017) <https://www.icanw.org/ican_receives_2017_ 
nobel_peace_prize>, archived at <https://perma.cc/62SN-E4L5>.  
 14 For further discussion of the humanitarian initiative, see Elizabeth Minor, ‘Changing the 
Discourse on Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Initiative’ (2016) 97(889) International 
Review of the Red Cross 711; Rebecca Davis Gibbons, ‘The Humanitarian Turn in Nuclear 
Disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ (2018) 25(1) 
Nonproliferation Review 11. 
 15 TPNW, UN Doc A/CONF.229/2017/8 (n 12) Preamble para 2. See NPT (n 2) art VI. 
 16 As the number of ratifications of the TPNW continues to increase, the author wishes to make 
clear that the discussion that follows is based on the number of ratifications as of 30 September 
2020. It may, however, likely be the case that the TPNW has achieved its required 50 
ratifications in order to enter into force by the time this article is published. 
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agreed that there exists a customary prohibition on atmospheric, underwater and 
outer space nuclear testing,17 it remains uncertain whether a customary prohibition 
on nuclear explosive tests in all environments, including underground testing, has 
crystallised at this time.18 My intention in this article is not to analyse the extent 
to which the widespread support for the TPNW prohibitions may have an effect on 
this developing parallel customary prohibition, but rather to analyse the state of 
treaty-based obligations in relation to nuclear weapon testing prohibitions. 
II EARLY NUCLEAR TESTING PROHIBITIONS 
While attempts to prohibit nuclear weapon testing can be traced back to the 
dawn of the nuclear weapons era, multilateral negotiations towards this goal did 
not commence until the early 1950s.19  With the growing awareness of the 
environmental harm caused by atmospheric nuclear testing, made evident by the 
unexpected fallout from the Castle Bravo test in the Bikini Atoll in 1954,20 many 
civil society-based advocacy movements, including the Russell–Einstein 
Manifesto in 1955 and subsequent Pugwash Conference in 1957, helped generate 
 
 17 See Gabriella Venturini, ‘Test-bans and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization’ in 
Jonathan L Black-Branch and Dieter Fleck (eds), Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International 
Law (Asser Press, 2014) 133, 151; Andrew Michie, ‘Provisional Application of Non-
Proliferation Treaties’ in Daniel H Joyner and Marco Roscini (eds), Non-Proliferation Law 
as a Special Regime: A Contribution to Fragmentation Theory in International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 55, 80; Don MacKay, ‘The Testing of Nuclear Weapons 
under International Law’ in Gro Nystuen, Stuart Casey-Maslen and Annie Golden Bersagel 
(eds), Nuclear Weapons under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 292, 
317. Peter Hulsroj has even gone so far as to suggest that the prohibition on atmospheric 
testing has achieved the status of jus cogens: Peter Hulsroj, ‘Jus Cogens and Disarmament’ 
(2006) 46(1) Indian Journal of International Law 1, 8.  
 18 See generally Lisa Tabassi, ‘The Nuclear Test Ban: Lex Lata or de Lege Ferenda?’ (2009) 
14(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 309; James A Green, ‘India and a Customary 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban: Persistent Objection, Peremptory Norms and the 123 
Agreement’ (2011) 51(1) Indian Journal of International Law 3, 9–18, who argues that while 
there is evidence in support of this position, some uncertainty remains. For a contrary opinion, 
see Christopher Le Mon, ‘Did North Korea’s Nuclear Test Violate International Law?’, 
Opinio Juris (Blog Post, 9 October 2006) <http://opiniojuris.org/2006/10/09/did-north-
koreas-nuclear-test-violate-international-law/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/4U5Z-447H>; 
Masahiko Asada, ‘CTBT: Legal Questions Arising from Its Non-Entry-into-Force’ (2002) 
7(1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 85, 92–4; Daniel Rietiker, ‘The (Il?)legality of 
Nuclear Weapons Tests under International Law: Filling the Possible Legal Gap by Ensuring 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s Entry into Force’ (2017) 21(4) ASIL Insights 
(‘The (Il?)legality of Nuclear Weapons Tests’), who expresses some scepticism towards the 
existence of a customary test ban.  
 19 David A Koplow, Testing a Nuclear Test Ban: What Should Be Prohibited by a 
‘Comprehensive’ Treaty? (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996) 5–8 (‘Testing a Nuclear 
Test Ban’); Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements 
(SAGE Publications, 2nd ed, 2002) ch 4; David S Jonas, ‘The Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty: Current Legal Status in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test 
Explosion’ (2007) 39(4) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1007, 
1010–11 (‘The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’); Venturini (n 17) 135.  
 20 For a summary of the test and its effects, see Ariana Rowberry, ‘Castle Bravo: The Largest 
US Nuclear Explosion’, Brookings (Blog Post, 27 February 2014) 
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/02/27/castle-bravo-the-largest-u-s-nuclear-
explosion/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/VP6T-ESWX>.  
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greater public awareness of the effects of nuclear weapon testing.21 In addition, 
given the growing concern over the possible horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to additional states, the continued escalation of the nuclear arms race and 
the rising Cold War tensions as a result of events such as the U-2 spy plane incident 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis during the early 1960s, it became increasingly clear 
among states that reaching an agreement on a nuclear test ban was becoming 
essential.22 
In light of the more amicable stance of both the US and the Soviet Union 
towards restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons,23 some progress towards 
restricting nuclear weapon explosions came with the adoption of the 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water (‘PTBT’) in 1963.24 Under art I(1), the PTBT prohibits ‘any nuclear 
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion’ in the atmosphere, outer 
space, under water and ‘in any other environment if such explosion causes 
radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under 
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted’. 25  While this 
prohibition covers ‘peaceful’ nuclear tests through the inclusion of the phrase ‘any 
other nuclear explosion’, underground nuclear explosive tests remain permitted, 
provided that any such explosion does not result in radioactive debris spreading 
into the territory of another state.26 Consequently, although the PTBT helped curb 
radioactive pollution spreading throughout the atmospheric environment,27 
David Koplow argues that it has ‘not appreciably retarded the pace of explosions 
— it has simply driven them underground — or slowed the rate of weapons 
development’.28 
Shortly after the adoption of the PTBT, the NPT was adopted in 1968 and 
remains the ‘cornerstone’ of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament legal 
framework. The NPT established two categories of states: the five de jure nuclear 
 
 21 Rebecca Johnson, Unfinished Business: The Negotiation of the CTBT and the End of Nuclear 
Testing (UNIDIR Report No UNIDIR/2009/2, 2009) 10–17 (‘Unfinished Business’); ‘London 
Launch of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto’, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World 
Affairs (Web Page) <https://pugwash.org/1955/07/09/london-launch-of-the-russell-einstein-
manifesto/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/4ZB5-CABY>.  
 22 Venturini (n 17) 137; Jonas, ‘The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ (n 19) 1011.  
 23 Goldblat (n 19) 48.  
 24 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
opened for signature 5 August 1963, 480 UNTS 43 (entered into force 10 October 1963) 
(‘PTBT’). This is commonly referred to as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty or the Limited Test-
Ban Treaty. 
 25 Ibid art I(1). 
 26 Goldblat (n 19) 49.  
 27 Ibid 51.  
 28 Koplow, Testing a Nuclear Test Ban (n 19) 8.  
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weapon states (‘NWS’) under art IX(3) and all other NNWS.29 While the principal 
objective of the NPT was to prevent further horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
weapons,30 the Treaty contains an implicit prohibition on nuclear weapon testing 
applicable to NNWS parties under art II by obligating these states not to transfer, 
‘manufacture, receive, control or otherwise acquire’ nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.31 Indeed, Lisa Tabassi notes that ‘it would be difficult 
to imagine circumstances in which a non-nuclear-weapon State could test and still 
be in compliance with Article II’.32 Moreover, this implicit prohibition under art II 
does not apply to the five NWS. Finally, the adoption of art VI requires states party 
to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament’.33 The NPT 
preamble similarly recognises the desire to build upon the PTBT in order to 
‘achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time 
and to continue negotiations to this end’.34 Though a treaty’s preamble is not 
legally binding, this recognition generated further impetus for states to conclude a 
comprehensive test ban treaty, which would constitute an ‘effective measure’ 
towards nuclear disarmament as envisaged by art VI.35 
In addition to the PTBT, other multilateral agreements that prohibit nuclear 
weapon testing in both uninhabited and inhabited regions were concluded.  
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 prohibits the testing of any weapons, and specifically 
nuclear explosions, within its defined zone, 36  while the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 1967 prevents the testing of any 
 
 29 NPT (n 2) art IX(3). An NWS is defined as a state ‘which has manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967’. This includes the 
US, the Soviet Union (and its successor state, Russia), the United Kingdom, France and China. 
All other states are therefore considered NNWS. At the same time, it is recognised that four 
states have since developed nuclear weapons after 1967 and are therefore considered de facto 
nuclear weapon possessing states. These are Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK. 
When collectively referring to all nine nuclear weapon possessing states, the acronym 
‘NWPS’ will be used to differentiate from the five de jure NWS noted above. For a concise 
discussion that explores this distinction in the context of achieving universality under the NPT, 
see David S Jonas, ‘Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the “Final Four” Join the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States while Retaining Their Nuclear 
Weapons?’ [2005] (2) Michigan State Law Review 417, 433–6. See also ‘Nuclear Weapons: 
Who Has What at a Glance’, Arms Control Association (Fact Sheet, July 2019). 
 30 See, eg, Morton A Kaplan, ‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Its Rationale, Prospects 
and Possible Impact on International Law’ (1969) 18(1) Journal of Public Law 1, 3; 
Guido den Dekker, The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 74; Christopher A Ford, ‘Debating Disarmament: 
Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (2007) 
14(3) Nonproliferation Review 401. On the other hand, Daniel H Joyner has argued that the 
obligations permitting peaceful uses of nuclear technology under art IV and to pursue nuclear 
disarmament under art VI are equally as relevant and none should have prioritisation: 
Daniel H Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 26, 32.  
 31 MacKay (n 17) 299.  
 32 Tabassi (n 18) 313.  
 33 NPT (n 2) art VI. 
 34 Ibid Preamble para 10.  
 35 Ibid art VI. 
 36 The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into 
force 23 June 1961) arts I(1), V.  
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type of weapon, conventional or nuclear, on the moon or other celestial bodies.37 
Moreover, five nuclear weapon-free zones (‘NWFZ’) within inhabited regions 
have been established by five separate treaties,38 each of which prohibit their 
respective states party from acquiring or testing nuclear weapons.39 The NWFZ 
treaties also include protocols that the NWS are able to ratify, which guarantee 
that the NWS will similarly refrain from conducting nuclear explosive tests in each 
specified region.40 
Nuclear weapon testing has also been restricted through the adoption of 
bilateral limitation arrangements between the US and the Soviet Union, the  
most significant of which was the Treaty between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground  
Nuclear Weapon Tests (‘TTBT’) of 1974, imposing a maximum yield of 150 kts 
on nuclear test explosions.41 However, while this agreement helped constrain the 
development of high-yield nuclear weapons, the TTBT failed to sufficiently 
restrain the nuclear arms race between the US and the Soviet Union.42 Overall, 
given the extensive variety of adopted treaties addressing nuclear weapon testing, 
the testing prohibitory regime has rightfully been described by Tabassi as 
‘fragmented’43 and similarly by Koplow as ‘inchoate and incomplete’.44 
III THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY 
In the end, it was not until 1994 that the Conference on Disarmament decided 
to ‘negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable 
 
 37 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 27 January 1967, 
610 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 October 1967) art IV.  
 38 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for signature 
14 February 1967, 634 UNTS 281 (entered into force 22 April 1968) (‘Treaty of Tlatelolco’); 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature 6 August 1985, 1445 UNTS 
177 (entered into force 11 December 1988) (‘Treaty of Rarotonga’); Treaty on the Southeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, opened for signature 15 December 1995, 1981 UNTS 129 
(entered into force 27 March 1997) (‘Treaty of Bangkok’). The other two were negotiated after 
the adoption of the CTBT: African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature 
11 April 1996, 35 ILM 698 (entered into force 15 July 2009) (‘Treaty of Pelindaba’); 
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, opened for signature 8 September 
2006, 2970 UNTS (entered into force 21 March 2009) (‘Treaty of Semipalatinsk’).  
 39 Treaty of Tlatelolco (n 38) art 1(1)(a); Treaty of Rarotonga (n 38) arts 3, 6; Treaty of Bangkok 
(n 38) arts 3(1)(c), (2)(a); Treaty of Pelindaba (n 38) arts 3, 5; Treaty of Semipalatinsk (n 38) 
arts 3, 5.  
 40 See, eg, Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, opened for 
signature 15 December 1995 (entered into force 16 July 1996) arts 1–3. However, it is worth 
noting that currently none of the NWS have ratified this specific Protocol: see ‘Protocol to the 
Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone’, United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (Web Page) <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bangkok_protocol>, 
archived at <https://perma.cc/2S2A-44HP>. 
 41 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, signed 3 July 1974, 13 ILM 906 
(entered into force 11 December 1990) art I(1). 
 42 Goldblat (n 19) 52–3.  
 43 Tabassi (n 18) 310.  
 44 David A Koplow, ‘Sherlock Holmes Meets Rube Goldberg: Fixing the Entry-into-Force 
Provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ (2017) 28(1) Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 1, 10 (‘Sherlock Holmes Meets Rube Goldberg’).  
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comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty’.45 Two-and-a-half years of negotiations 
followed before agreement could be reached on the proposed draft treaty; 
however, the consensus-based Conference on Disarmament remained gridlocked 
due to India’s objection to the final treaty text.46 As a result, Australia forwarded 
the finalised treaty draft to the UN General Assembly, which subsequently adopted 
and annexed the draft to Resolution 50/245 on 10 September 1996.47 Three key 
aspects of the CTBT will be discussed: first, and most significantly, the extent of 
the testing prohibition established; secondly, a brief overview of its verification 
framework; and thirdly, the challenges posed by its unique entry-into-force 
requirements and the attempts to circumvent this, as proposed academically. 
A Scope of the Testing Prohibition 
According to art I(1) of the CTBT, ‘[e]ach State Party undertakes not to carry 
out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to 
prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction 
or control’. 48  In addition, states party undertake to ‘refrain from causing, 
encouraging, or in any way participating’ in any nuclear weapon test explosions 
or other nuclear explosions.49 Although the obligation under art I(1) would seem, 
prima facie, to offer a fully comprehensive prohibition on both military and 
peaceful nuclear testing, it is accepted that the CTBT does not prohibit nuclear 
weapon testing activities that do not result in a nuclear explosion.50 Therefore, it 
is generally accepted that both subcritical and computer simulated testing 
experiments, among other activities that do not result in a self-sustaining nuclear 
reaction, remain permitted under the CTBT.51 
At this point, it is worth noting what exactly subcritical and computer simulated 
testing entails,52 as this will make clear the importance of these experiments in 
relation to the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.  
In subcritical experiments, fissile material used in nuclear warheads of a 
subcritical mass is used to simulate aspects of a nuclear explosion by exposing the 
nuclear material to chemical explosives under high pressure. However, rather than 
 
 45 Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee under Agenda Item 1: ‘Nuclear Test Ban’, 666th plen mtg, 
UN Doc CD/1238 (25 January 1994). For a summary of the negotiation of the CTBT, see 
generally Johnson, Unfinished Business (n 21) chs 3–6. 
 46 Jonas, ‘The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ (n 19) 1015–16. India rejected the 
CTBT for many reasons, but principally because the Treaty did not contain more concrete 
nuclear disarmament commitments and due to security considerations given China’s nuclear 
weapon possession. For an excellent account of India’s view of the CTBT, see Dinshaw 
Mistry, ‘Domestic–International Linkages: India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’ 
(1998) 6(1) Nonproliferation Review 25; Arundhati Ghose, ‘Negotiating the CTBT: India’s 
Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament’ (1997) 51(1) Journal of International Affairs 
239.  
 47 CTBT, UN Doc A/50/1027 (n 1).  
 48 Ibid art I(1) (emphasis added). 
 49 Ibid art I(2).  
 50 Asada (n 18) 87. 
 51 See Goldblat (n 19) 68; Venturini (n 17) 145; Asada (n 18) 87; Patricia Hewitson, 
‘Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm’ (2003) 21(3) Berkeley Journal of International Law 405, 
449 n 237.  
 52 This author will often refer to both concepts collectively under the broader brush of 
‘non-explosive’ tests.  
10 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 21 
resulting in a sustained nuclear chain reaction, the closely controlled 
configurations of subcritical experiments mean that no actual explosion of the 
nuclear material occurs. These tests provide information ‘on the behavior of this 
key element [(ie plutonium or other fissile materials)] when it is subjected to the 
shock of an explosion’.53 This helps to analyse the condition and deterioration of 
fissile material over time, allowing state officials to determine whether existing 
nuclear weapons will continue to perform as originally intended. 
Computer simulated tests, on the other hand, are somewhat more 
self-explanatory. By inputting into supercomputers data on the specifications of 
current or newly developed nuclear weapons alongside information gathered from 
previous explosive testing activities and research, states are able to obtain 
predictions regarding the expected performance of the nuclear weapon that has 
been simulated. This again allows NWPS54 to test and simulate how different 
components of existing or newly designed nuclear weapons will behave under 
certain conditions. For example, basic computer simulations of theoretical nuclear 
weapons explosions can be carried out on privately created interactive platforms 
such as NUKEMAP,55 although the expected effects and the inputted data would 
not be as accurate or detailed as those of extensively state-funded computer 
simulation experiments. Publicly accessible ‘simulation’ websites and 
hypothetical detonations also do not provide specific details on weapon 
performance, unlike state-funded, military computer simulations. 
This interpretive conclusion on the extent of the prohibition on testing 
established by art I(1) of the CTBT is made apparent through an application of the 
standard rules of treaty interpretation provided by arts 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’).56 Article 31(1) states that a 
treaty shall be interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose’. 57  While art 31 to some degree encapsulates each of the three 
traditional schools of treaty interpretation,58 the International Law Commission 
has reiterated that ‘the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the 
intentions of the parties’, and therefore ‘the starting point of interpretation is the 
 
 53 Frank von Hippel, ‘Subcritical Experiments’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (online, 
14 December 2012) <https://thebulletin.org/2012/12/subcritical-experiments/>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/L9X5-KU3R>.  
 54 For the differentiation between NWS and NWPS, see above n 29. 
 55 NUKEMAP (Website, 2012) <https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/>, archived at 
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person to input specified data on nuclear weapon yield and ‘detonate’ the device anywhere in 
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 56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 
331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (‘VCLT’) arts 31–2.  
 57 Ibid art 31(1). 
 58 Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, 
2nd ed, 1984) 114–5. See also Francis G Jacobs, ‘Varieties of Approach to Treaty 
Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties before 
the Vienna Diplomatic Conference’ (1969) 18(2) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 318, 318–20.  
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elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the 
intentions of the parties’.59 
It is first worth noting that what constitutes a nuclear weapon ‘test’ within the 
context of the CTBT is relatively clear and uncontroversial. Although undefined 
by the CTBT or PTBT, the word ‘test’ essentially refers to ‘[a] procedure intended 
to establish the quality, performance, or reliability of something, especially before 
it is taken into widespread use’.60 The ordinary meaning of this term in the present 
context of the CTBT is therefore appropriate to apply, as the objective of a nuclear 
weapon test is to ascertain that the device being tested works as intended.  
This does not pose any particular challenge. 
What poses greater difficulty here is the notion of ‘nuclear weapon test 
explosion’ and ‘any other nuclear explosion’; in other words, precisely what 
device is being tested. First, the term ‘explosion’ is defined as ‘[a] violent 
shattering or blowing apart of something, as is caused by a bomb’61 or ‘a sudden, 
violent burst of energy, for example one caused by a bomb’.62 This would seem 
to entail a physical event through a release of energy, caused by a device of some 
kind, which would generally result in some form of material damage. Taking this 
definition as a starting point also proves practical as it would seem to align with 
our ordinary understanding of what a ‘nuclear weapon test explosion’ actually 
entails: an event where a nuclear bomb is detonated, be that underground, 
underwater, in outer space or in the atmosphere. Moreover, it is clear that this 
understanding captures nuclear explosive tests of either a military or ‘peaceful’ 
nature, despite efforts by China to carve out a possible exception permitting 
peaceful tests.63 
Another view advanced by Stuart Casey-Maslen and Tobias Vestner is that the 
prohibition under art I(1) of the CTBT ultimately reflects the obligation contained 
in art I(1) of the PTBT and, from their perspective, the inclusion of the phrase 
‘nuclear weapon test explosion’ demonstrates that the ‘ban is limited to a 
functioning nuclear explosive device’ that results in a nuclear chain reaction and 
subsequent explosion.64 Indeed, the general objective of any weapons test is to 
check the ‘quality, performance, or reliability’65  of the finalised weapon, as 
opposed to testing specific components or aspects that form part of the completed 
weapon itself, which often occurs separately.66 Consequently, it seems clear that 
only the testing of a completed nuclear device that results in an explosive event 
 
 59 Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session 
3–28 January 1966 and on Its Eighteenth Session 4 May – 19 July 1966, UN GAOR, 21st sess, 
Supp No 9, UN Doc A/6309/Rev.1 (1966) 51 (emphasis added). 
 60 Lexico (online at 24 September 2020) ‘test’ (n1, def 1).  
 61 Lexico (online at 24 September 2020) ‘explosion’ (def 1). 
 62 Collins Dictionary (online at 24 September 2020) ‘explosion’ (def 1). 
 63 Huw Llewellyn, ‘The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ (1997) 10(2) Leiden Journal 
of International Law 269, 271–2.  
 64 Stuart Casey-Maslen and Tobias Vestner, A Guide to International Disarmament Law 
(Routledge, 2019) 92 [5.8].  
 65 Lexico (online at 24 September 2020) ‘test’ (n1, def 1). 
 66 A useful example in this regard would be the separate testing of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and other delivery systems capable of deploying the designed nuclear warhead. 
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(regardless of yield size) is prohibited by art I(1) of the CTBT,67 whereas any 
‘non-explosive’ tests and experiments, including subcritical and computer 
simulated tests, would remain permitted by the CTBT. 
 This interpretation of art I(1) is further justified when considering both the 
context and the object and purpose of the CTBT. 68 Preambles often reflect a 
treaty’s object and purpose and form part of a treaty’s context pursuant to art 31(2) 
of the VCLT.69 The CTBT preamble notes how the  
cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions,  
by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons 
and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes 
an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its 
aspects …70  
This largely reflects the divergent views of the NNWS and NWS over the 
primary object and purpose underlying the CTBT: that prohibiting nuclear weapon 
test explosions constitutes an effective measure towards nuclear disarmament for 
the former and a tool in preventing further proliferation for the latter.71 
Prohibiting only nuclear explosive tests under art I(1) of the CTBT can certainly 
contribute towards both these goals. With regard to non-proliferation, although it 
has been suggested that a potential proliferator with sufficient knowledge and 
access to nuclear materials could develop a first generation nuclear weapon with 
reasonable confidence and without requiring the need to explosively test the 
constructed device,72 it remains the case that the full testing of a nuclear weapon 
or explosive device would be necessary in order to ensure full confidence in the 
capacity of the constructed device.73 In other words, for any state that decides to 
construct a new nuclear device, subcritical and computer simulated tests alone 
would likely prove insufficient to ensure complete confidence in the developed 
device. 
How this interpretation of art I(1) of the CTBT impacts the objective of 
achieving nuclear disarmament is perhaps more debatable. Masahiko Asada, 
writing in 2002, has noted that both Russia and the US have taken advantage of 
this testing ‘loophole’ in order to conduct ‘safety and reliability’ checks of their 
 
 67 See Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Issue Brief No 
IB92099, Congressional Research Service, United States Congress, 21 June 2006) 7 
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 68 Though object and purpose are identified separately, it is generally considered that both 
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Three Interpretive Methods’ (2010) 43(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 565, 578.  
 69 VCLT (n 56) art 31(2). 
 70 CTBT, UN Doc A/50/1027 (n 1) Preamble para 5 (emphasis added).  
 71 Guido den Dekker, ‘Forbearance is No Acquittance: The Legal Status of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ (2000) 13(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 669, 673 
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 72 This was mentioned in relation to non-state actor nuclear proliferation by John M 
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concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’ (2001) 31(1) Arms Control Today 
18, 27.  
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respective stockpiles.74 The US, for instance, recently carried out the ‘EDIZA’ 
subcritical test in February 2019.75 In addition, a recent study carried out by the 
China Academy of Engineering Physics has claimed that China has conducted 
approximately 200 computer simulated blasts between September 2014 and 
December 2017,76  while the DPRK also admitted to carrying out subcritical 
experiments in 2018 before the destruction of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in 
May 2018.77 However, even if the NWPS are conducting non-explosive tests for 
‘safety and reliability’ purposes as so claimed, an obvious by-product of these 
experiments is that the lifespan of existing nuclear weapon stockpiles can be 
extended, thereby preventing the CTBT from realising one of its primary 
objectives, ‘which was to halt vertical proliferation and put the nuclear-armed 
states on the road to nuclear disarmament’.78 At the same time, considering that 
the subsequent practice of states can provide interpretative guidance as reaffirmed 
by art 31(3)(b) of the VCLT,79 arguably the acceptance (or, at the very least, the 
lack of protest from the broader international community) of these non-explosive 
testing activities further suggests that they remain permitted under the art I(1) 
prohibition in the CTBT. 
Yet, on the other hand, the CTBT prohibition on nuclear weapon explosive tests 
does still impose significant limitations on the vertical proliferation of nuclear 
weapons among the NWPS. Most significantly, prohibiting the NWPS from 
conducting full-scale nuclear weapon tests prevents the testing state from ensuring 
that a modernised or ‘newly developed weapon in fact detonates as designed’.80 
Non-explosive activities can only provide confidence in weapon performance to a 
certain degree and certainly cannot replace the information gathered from actual 
explosive tests. Furthermore, the entry into force of the CTBT is regularly cited as 
an essential ‘effective measure’ to be achieved pursuant to art VI of the NPT and 
the objective of nuclear disarmament,81 as the CTBT prohibition on all states 
conducting nuclear explosive tests can help establish a more conducive 
environment for nuclear disarmament. Consequently, to suggest that the 
‘loophole’ created by the CTBT negates the Treaty’s practical benefits altogether 
is certainly naive, although closing such a gap would undoubtedly bring further 
benefits and potential for nuclear disarmament success. 
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Finally, art 32 of the VCLT holds that the travaux préparatoires of a treaty can 
be used to confirm the meaning of a treaty’s terms or to determine the meaning of 
a provision should its ordinary interpretation remain ambiguous or lead to a 
manifestly absurd result.82 However, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in 
the Territorial Dispute case has reiterated that this should not displace the fact that 
the ‘[i]nterpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’.83 In 
relation to the present discussion, Asada has noted that Indonesia introduced an 
early proposal suggesting that the CTBT should be extended to prohibit subcritical 
experiments, though this was later withdrawn ‘in the spirit of compromise and for 
the sake of consensus’.84  India similarly supported the inclusion of computer 
simulated testing, arguing that the Treaty should prevent the NWS from 
developing ‘new advanced types of nuclear-weapons’, though again this proposed 
restriction was deemed unacceptable to the other NWPS.85 
In light of the above, it comes as no surprise that some commentators have 
questioned whether the prohibitions under art I(1) of the CTBT are fully 
‘comprehensive’. Permitting subcritical and computer simulated testing allows the 
NWPS to take legally permitted steps through established ‘loopholes’ to prolong 
the existing lifespan of, and even qualitatively improve, existing nuclear weapon 
stockpiles, thus undermining the extent to which the CTBT can contribute to the 
objective of nuclear disarmament.86 Consequently, the need to establish testing 
prohibitions that incorporate both subcritical and computer simulated activities 
constitutes an essential step towards the long-term objective of nuclear 
disarmament. 
B Verification and Monitoring under the CTBT 
Perhaps one of the most successful and impressive features of the CTBT is the 
verification and monitoring framework that it establishes. Although this is not the 
place to explore this aspect of the CTBT in detail, a brief overview of the proposed 
verification mechanisms and process clearly demonstrates the importance of this 
component of the CTBT framework,87 especially when considering this article’s 
later discussion of how the TPNW may impact the operation of the CTBT. 
Article II of the CTBT establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (‘CTBTO’), an independent international organisation designed to 
oversee the implementation of the Treaty. Alongside this organisational body, the 
CTBT establishes a varied range of verification processes and mechanisms under 
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art IV and its associated protocols and annexes, often carried out with the 
involvement of the CTBTO. Arguably, the most important aspect of this 
framework is the International Monitoring System (‘IMS’), comprising 337 data 
collection and laboratory facilities globally 88  that are capable of conducting 
seismological, hydro-acoustic and radionuclide detection to monitor nuclear 
explosive testing activities.89 The IMS is complemented by a system of onsite 
inspections, operational upon the CTBT’s entry into force, which allows any state 
party to request an inspection to determine whether another state party has 
conducted a nuclear test explosion contrary to its obligations under art I(1).90 
Finally, an elaborate series of consultation, clarification and confidence-building 
measures is also established.91 Given this extensive detail, it is not surprising that 
the CTBT verification framework is often regarded as perhaps its most outstanding 
feature.92 
Moreover, despite the fact that the CTBT is not yet in force,93 the CTBTO is 
operating on a provisional basis following the adoption of the Text on the 
Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty Organization.94 The CTBTO Preparatory Commission (‘CTBTO 
PrepCom’) has functioned as a temporary surrogate body, tasked with establishing 
and implementing the verification regime under art IV prior to the CTBT’s entry 
into force.95 As such, a substantial portion of the CTBT’s verification system is 
already operational and has provided information relating to the recent DPRK 
nuclear tests, including data on the location, depth and magnitude of these tests.96 
However, the highly significant onsite inspection arm will only come into effect, 
and therefore be able to be invoked by other parties, upon the entry into force of 
the CTBT as a whole. As such, although the CTBTO PrepCom has proved a 
genuine success in the interim, the full potential of the CTBT verification 
framework is yet to be realised. 
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C Entry-into-Force Obstacles 
In addition to the ‘loopholes’ established under art I(1), the CTBT is further 
undermined by its unique entry-into-force requirements. Under art XIV(1), the 
CTBT will enter into force 180 days after the 44 states listed under annex 2,97 
which the International Atomic Energy Agency listed in 1996 as having either 
nuclear power and/or research reactors,98 have ratified the Treaty.99 The supposed 
rationale here, as noted by the United Kingdom, China and Russia, was based on 
an intention to not accept ‘restrictions on their nuclear programmes unless all 
“threshold” or aspirant nuclear-weapon programmes were likewise curbed’,100 
thereby imposing an equal constraint on all nuclear-capable states.101 In theory, 
this justification makes pragmatic sense, as it is unlikely that a NWPS will 
unilaterally restrict its testing activities unless all other NWPS are equally 
restrained. This reciprocity largely explains the success of recent moratoria on 
nuclear weapon testing that have been complied with by the majority of NWPS 
over the past 20 years.102 
Despite the rationale behind this requirement, art XIV(1) of the CTBT has 
ultimately become a ‘veto’ power for the annex 2 states that has prevented the 
CTBT’s entry into force, 103  largely due to individualistic, security-driven 
considerations in maintaining a modernised nuclear deterrent. India, for example, 
has consistently and vehemently opposed the CTBT generally, particularly raising 
objection to art XIV(1) and the discriminatory nature of the Treaty itself, as it 
maintains the dichotomy of nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ and it fails to 
emphasise the importance of achieving progress towards nuclear disarmament.104 
Other ‘hold out’ states have similarly offered little indication of their intention to 
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ratify the Treaty in the near future. Despite becoming the first signatory under the 
Clinton administration, there has been either an inability or explicit unwillingness 
of the US to ratify the CTBT through the Senate.105 Indeed, the 2018 US Nuclear 
Posture Review explicitly states that the Trump administration will not seek Senate 
ratification of the CTBT at this time, but notes that it ‘will continue to support the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory 
Committee’.106 Although China’s current position on ratification is unclear, it has 
continued to cooperate in implementing the IMS verification mechanisms.107 
Overall, it is highly unlikely that the CTBT will enter into force in either the short- 
or medium-term given the fierce opposition to the Treaty among some of the ‘hold 
out’ states, which seems unlikely to change in the near future. 
Although the CTBT’s obligations are not directly binding pending the Treaty’s 
entry into force, both current signatories and ratified states remain under an 
‘interim obligation’108 to ‘refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of’ the CTBT, pursuant to art 18 of the VCLT.109 The only exceptions are 
if signatories ‘have made [their] intention clear not to become a party’ to the 
CTBT 110  or, for ratifying states, if the entry into force has been ‘unduly 
delayed’.111 It has been convincingly argued, and claimed even by the NWS,112 
that any nuclear explosive tests carried out prior to the entry into force of the CTBT 
would violate its object and purpose in contributing towards both nuclear 
non-proliferation and disarmament by unbalancing the ‘status quo’ that existed at 
the time of signature.113 Moreover, it is certainly foreseeable that a single nuclear 
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weapon test by one NWPS could even trigger testing by other NWPS in 
response.114 
Given the growing number of CTBT signatories and ratifications115 and annual 
General Assembly resolutions calling for the Treaty’s entry into force,116 and with 
near universal state practice in conformity with the testing prohibition in art I(1) 
of the CTBT, it would seem fair to suggest that entry into force is not currently 
unduly delayed,117 particularly when one considers the element of foreseeability 
of this delay based on the unprecedented and onerous entry-into-force 
requirements contained within art XIV(1). However, there remains a weakness in 
relying upon art 18 of the VCLT, as a signatory state can simply withdraw its 
consent to be bound and thereby make clear its intention not to become a party to 
the CTBT. Such withdrawal of signature by a NWPS ‘would be potentially fatal to 
the Treaty’, leading to a reciprocal resumption of testing by other nuclear weapon 
states.118 Article 18 therefore offers only limited respite in this respect. 
Given this state of limbo, various recommendations have been raised to address 
the non-entry into force of the CTBT. 119  Although art XIV(2) of the CTBT 
provides for conferences aimed at accelerating the ratification process, little 
progress has been made in bringing the remaining annex 2 states closer to 
ratification. 120  Other suggestions to resolve the CTBT’s non-entry into force 
include the provisional application of the entire CTBT pursuant to art 25 of the 
VCLT,121 potential amendment of the CTBT text122 and the possible adoption of a 
Chapter VII UN Security Council resolution that would ‘“determine” that any 
further nuclear weapon testing by any country would constitute a “threat to the 
peace” and “decide” that no such testing shall be done’.123 Each of these proposals 
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has either failed to gain sufficient state support or contains various other defects, 
which limit its potential utility for present purposes. 
As such, although the entry into force or alternative implementation of the 
CTBT would certainly be a welcome addition to the nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament legal framework by providing a global, legally binding prohibition 
on nuclear weapon test explosions and effectuating its verification framework, at 
present, the Treaty remains stagnant with limited prospects of change in the 
foreseeable future. When this is coupled with the fact that non-explosive testing 
remains permitted by art I(1) of the CTBT, the Treaty ultimately fails to offer a 
truly comprehensive — or realistically achievable — framework prohibiting all 
nuclear testing activities under international law at this time. In light of this rather 
bleak conclusion, the importance of assessing the scope and potential impact of 
the prohibitions under the TPNW becomes apparent. 
IV BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The TPNW emerged as a result of the civil society-led humanitarian initiative, 
consolidating a new trend towards ‘humanitarian disarmament’124 that sought to 
raise awareness of, and ultimately address, ‘the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons’.125 At the same time, there was an 
underlying sense of frustration among the non-aligned NNWS over the slow pace 
of disarmament efforts by the NWS pursuant to art VI of the NPT.126 Despite 
identifying effective measures towards nuclear disarmament at both the 2000 and 
2010 NPT review conferences, including, amongst other steps, ratification of the 
CTBT,127 progress towards the implementation of these identified steps has been 
very limited.128  Moreover, all of the NWPS continue to rely upon nuclear 
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deterrence and are implementing extensive modernisation programmes for their 
existing nuclear stockpiles.129 
Two paths emerged to pursue this humanitarian-based agenda. The first was a 
series of ‘humanitarian conferences’ held between March 2013 and December 
2014, providing space for academic experts, civil society groups including  
both the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’) and ICAN,  
and non-aligned NNWS to raise public awareness of the immediate and  
long-term humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use.130 The final Vienna 
Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons saw the endorsement 
of the Humanitarian Pledge, which recognised the need to ‘identify and pursue 
effective measures to fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of 
nuclear weapons … in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and 
associated risks’.131 
The non-aligned NNWS were concurrently taking steps within both the NPT 
review process and the UN General Assembly through a series of joint 
‘humanitarian’ statements, the first of which was issued by Switzerland at the 2012 
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference. This statement welcomed the conclusions of the 2010 Review 
Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reiterated 
the ‘utmost importance that these [nuclear] weapons never be used again’ and 
argued that ‘[t]he only way to guarantee this is the total, irreversible and verifiable 
elimination of nuclear weapons’.132 The content of the subsequent statements did 
not change substantively.133 However, the number of co-sponsors increased at an 
impressive rate, with the final statement in the NPT review process being 
supported by 159 states at the 2015 Review Conference for the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (‘2015 NPT Review Conference’)134 and 
support in the General Assembly First Committee for a near identical statement 
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growing from 34 co-sponsors in 2012135 to 155 states just two years later.136  
In addition, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/56, establishing an 
open-ended working group (‘OEWG’) in 2013 to ‘develop proposals to take 
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations’.137 
Despite this growing support for the humanitarian initiative and the desire to 
begin negotiations towards new effective measures towards disarmament, the 
2015 NPT Review Conference failed to reach consensus on a final document. 
Consequently, the non-aligned NNWS turned back to the UN and adopted General 
Assembly Resolution 70/33, which called for the convening of a second OEWG 
in order ‘to substantively address concrete effective legal measures, legal 
provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world 
without nuclear weapons’.138 The final report of the 2016 OEWG concluded that 
the ‘majority of States’139 expressed support for  
the convening, by the General Assembly, of a conference in 2017, open to all States, 
with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil 
society, to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, 
leading towards their total elimination …140  
Soon after, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/258 establishing the 
mandate for the subsequent 2017 negotiations.141 
The negotiations took place in two sessions in March and June–July 2017,142 
with representatives from 125 states participating alongside many experts from 
civil society offering further insights.143 It was soon clear that a prohibition-style 
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treaty was generally preferred by participants as the most achievable outcome 
possible, particularly given the lack of participation by any of the NWPS.144  
After revising various draft texts put forward by the Conference President 
Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica, the final treaty text was put to 
a vote before the Conference on 7 July 2017, with 122 states voting in favour, one 
abstaining (Singapore) and one voting against (the Netherlands).145 
The TPNW preamble reiterates the negotiating states’ deep concern  
about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use 
of nuclear weapons, and [their recognition of] the consequent need to completely 
eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear 
weapons are never used again …146  
Moreover, para 15 of the preamble recognises that ‘a legally binding 
prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the 
achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons’, an end to 
which the states party are ‘determined to act’. 147  This clearly reaffirms the 
underlying objective of addressing the humanitarian suffering caused by nuclear 
weapons through the elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby contributing 
towards nuclear disarmament and eventually achieving and maintaining a nuclear 
weapon-free world.148 
It must be emphasised at this stage that the TPNW goes further than prohibiting 
just the testing of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Instead, the Treaty 
builds upon the existing regional NWFZ and other disarmament treaties, and 
incorporates perhaps the most detailed and comprehensive range of prohibitions 
in order to facilitate efforts towards nuclear disarmament.149  Thus, while this 
article focuses solely on the breadth of the testing prohibitions, this overarching 
objective of facilitating the elimination of nuclear weapons must be kept in mind 
throughout the present discussion. 
V SCOPE OF THE TESTING PROHIBITION UNDER ARTICLE 1(1)(A) OF THE TPNW 
It was apparent throughout the TPNW negotiations that some reference to a 
prohibition on nuclear weapon testing was desired by the majority, though not all, 
of the participating delegations in order to reinforce the intended 
comprehensiveness of the prohibitions as a whole.150 However, it soon became 
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clear that the exact form and scope of this prohibition would prove to be the subject 
of much debate during the negotiations.151 Eventually the final text was reached 
under art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW, which says:  
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:  
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or 
stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices …152 
Although the TPNW does not define the term ‘test’ at any point, based on the 
assessment of the ordinary meaning of the word ‘test’ undertaken in relation to the 
CTBT,153 and given that all the discussed treaties in Parts II and III have a similar 
subject matter regarding the regulation of nuclear weapon testing activities, one 
can reasonably assume that the understanding of the term ‘test’ accepted 
previously was intended to carry through to the TPNW. Indeed, there is no 
indication to suggest that this would not be the case, nor was there any discussion 
during the negotiations clarifying precisely what ‘test’ means in the TPNW 
context. Thus, as with the CTBT, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘test’, that being 
a ‘procedure intended to establish the quality, performance, or reliability of 
something, especially before it is taken into widespread use’,154 remains suitably 
applicable in the context of the TPNW. 
However, upon closer inspection, it is apparent that the TPNW prohibition 
under art 1(1)(a) imposes a slightly different formulation of the testing prohibition 
in comparison to that of the CTBT. Whereas art I(1) of the CTBT prohibits each 
state party from carrying out any ‘nuclear weapon test explosions’ or ‘any other 
nuclear explosions’, art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW adopts a subtly different phrasing, 
stating: ‘each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to … test … 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’. Consequently, art 1(1)(a) 
seemingly prohibits (1) the testing of nuclear weapons, without imposing a 
qualification that an ‘explosion’ is required; and (2) the testing of other nuclear 
explosive devices, which includes an ‘explosion’ requirement as with the CTBT. 
In other words, while the concept of ‘test’ poses few interpretative challenges,  
the issue here concerns what precisely is being tested in the first place, that is,  
the subject matter of the test. 
Dealing with the second prohibition first, the Treaty of Rarotonga defines a 
nuclear explosive device as ‘any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable 
of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be 
used’.155 The term also ‘includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and 
partly assembled forms’. 156  This definition, therefore, covers fission and 
thermonuclear devices that have not been weaponised because, for example, they 
are too large for existing delivery systems, as well as the use of such devices for 
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any purpose, including peaceful purposes.157 While this certainly captures both 
peaceful and military nuclear explosive detonations in a comparable manner to the 
CTBT, it seems unlikely that such a definition would cover non-explosive testing 
activities due to the retained requirement of an explosive event. 
A more challenging question is, what constitutes a nuclear weapon? Unlike the 
definitions of the prohibited weapons provided by the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (‘BWC’)158 and the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (‘CWC’), 159 there is no 
agreed definition of the term ‘nuclear weapon’ under the NPT and CTBT, nor 
under international law more generally. A useful definition is provided by art 5 of 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which defines a nuclear weapon as ‘any device which is 
capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a 
group of characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes’.160 
Lexico defines ‘nuclear weapon’ in a more simplistic manner as ‘[a] bomb or 
missile that uses nuclear energy to cause an explosion’.161 While calling for the 
inclusion of a definition of nuclear weapons within the TPNW, Sweden submitted 
a working paper to the 2017 Negotiation Conference162 defining ‘nuclear weapon’ 
as a ‘[weapon] assembly that is capable of producing an explosion and massive 
damage and destruction by the sudden release of energy instantaneously released 
from self-sustaining nuclear fission and/or fusion’.163 This directly drew upon the 
P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms definition established by the permanent 
members of the Security Council.164 
As a result, and similar to the understanding reached in relation to the 
prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions under the CTBT and the PTBT,165 
the term ‘nuclear weapon’ in the TPNW seems to require the detonation of a 
completed nuclear device that is able to release nuclear energy (as ordinarily 
understood) as an essential aspect of the explosion taking place, be that through a 
fission- or fusion-based uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction.166  Consequently, 
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although art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW is linguistically distinctive from art I(1) of the 
CTBT, it would initially seem clear that the TPNW prohibition, based upon its 
ordinary meaning alone, would only cover nuclear weapon or explosive devices 
tests that result in a nuclear explosion event releasing nuclear energy. This again 
would seem to permit subcritical and computer simulated testing on similar 
grounds to art I(1) of the CTBT. 
On the other hand, when one recalls the object and purpose of the TPNW in 
facilitating nuclear disarmament generally, it would seem reasonable to give a 
greater degree of leniency in support of an expansive interpretation of the general 
prohibitions included within art 1. Although analysing the object and purpose of a 
treaty forms a ‘secondary or ancillary process in the application of the general rule 
on interpretation’, Ian Sinclair does suggest that the object and purpose can still 
be used to test, confirm and modify the conclusion reached from a textual approach 
if appropriate.167 From this perspective, it seems somewhat counterintuitive to 
permit non-explosive activities that may hinder the realisation of the TPNW’s 
fundamental object and purpose of achieving nuclear disarmament. 
At the same time, however, an over-reliance on a teleological approach to 
interpretation can risk distorting the ordinary meaning of the text, which should 
always remain the starting point. 168 A similar conclusion was reached during 
Case No A28 by the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, which noted that  
‘a treaty’s object and purpose is to be used only to clarify the text, not to provide 
independent sources of meaning that contradict the clear text’.169 Consequently, 
while the TPNW’s object and purpose may support the position that a wider 
prohibition on testing should be adopted, this should not come at the expense of 
undermining, and ultimately contradicting, the ordinary meaning of art 1(1)(a) 
reached above. 
Another interesting argument is raised by Marco Roscini — though admittedly 
not in the context of the TPNW — when he compares the language incorporated 
in art 5 of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk (which prohibits ‘nuclear weapon test 
explosion[s]’ in a similar manner to the CTBT) 170 with the obligations adopted in 
both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Bangkok (which prohibit the testing 
of nuclear weapons without directly referencing the need for a nuclear 
explosion,171 consistent with the prohibition under art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW). 
Although Roscini suggests this may simply have been an ‘oversight’ by the 
negotiators of these treaties, he argues that the consequence of this linguistical 
difference is that the Treaty of Semipalatinsk imposes a narrower, more specific 
obligation prohibiting ‘nuclear weapon explosions’ only, whereas the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Bangkok impose a more general and therefore wider 
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obligation by referring solely to the term ‘test’ of nuclear weapons, which can 
encompass both simulated and subcritical tests.172 
When applied to the present discussion, Roscini’s argument would suggest that 
the TPNW establishes a more general, comprehensive undertaking not to test 
nuclear weapons in a broader sense, in contrast to the specific requirement not to 
conduct nuclear test explosions under art I(1) of the CTBT. This conclusion is 
similarly shared by Daniel Rietiker and Manfred Mohr, who claim that ‘[w]hile 
the [TPNW] refers to nuclear “test” very generally’, the CTBT, in contrast, imposes 
a more specific requirement that an explosion must have occurred.173 The authors 
similarly argue, albeit much more briefly, that this clear difference creates a 
broader prohibition that extends to subcritical and computer simulated tests, thus 
adopting a similar line of reasoning to that proposed by Roscini.174 In other words, 
this difference of phrasing should be considered a significant and deliberate 
alteration from that of art I(1) of the CTBT, as opposed to an oversight of the 
negotiating delegations of the TPNW. 
This presents an intriguing point and is particularly persuasive when one 
considers the preparatory history of the TPNW. As noted, art 32 of the VCLT 
provides for recourse to the travaux préparatoires of a treaty to either confirm the 
meaning of the treaty after applying the general rule of treaty interpretation under 
art 31 or to aid its interpretation if, following an assessment under art 31, the 
meaning remains ‘ambiguous or obscure’ or ‘leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable’.175  While Sinclair notes that use of the travaux 
préparatoires is commonly referred to in international disputes related to 
interpretational matters,176 the ICJ is generally cautious when resorting to the 
travaux préparatoires, reiterating that ‘[i]nterpretation must be based above all 
upon the text of the treaty’. 177  However, in light of the present ambiguity,  
the travaux préparatoires may help shed some light on the current discussion. 
In the first draft of the TPNW submitted on 22 May 2017, Conference President 
Whyte Gómez included the following prohibition: ‘Each State Party undertakes 
never under any circumstances to … [c]arry out any nuclear weapon test explosion 
or any other nuclear explosion’.178  In effect, the 22 May draft would have 
contained a precise duplication of the prohibition under art I(1) of the CTBT and 
would have therefore presented little controversy regarding the scope of the 
obligation established. In explaining the first draft, President Whyte Gómez noted 
that she drew upon inputs from participating states during the March negotiation 
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session and synthesised ‘common elements’ into the draft text, 179  while 
emphasising that the proposed treaty text ‘should … in no way undermine the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime … but … strengthen and complement it’.180  
However, as negotiations continued, it was clear that three separate approaches 
regarding the extent of the testing prohibition to be included were gradually 
emerging amongst the participating state delegations. First, a number of states, 
including Brazil, Cuba and Ecuador, called for a broader approach to the concept 
of testing under art 1 from an early stage.181 Casey-Maslen notes that Ecuador in 
particular ‘wanted to see subcritical testing explicitly prohibited’.182 A second 
group of states sought to pay deference to the continued importance of the CTBT, 
which was incorporated into Preamble para 19 of the TPNW. Among these states, 
Guatemala called for the inclusion of the undertaking never to test nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,183 which was eventually adopted.  
The final group sought to delete any specific obligation relating to nuclear testing. 
These states included both Sweden and Mexico, who argued that art 1(1)(e) as 
originally drafted was unnecessary, as the prohibition was already covered by the 
CTBT, and that its inclusion even risked undermining the CTBT framework by 
creating an alternative prohibitory framework.184 
In essence, the travaux préparatoires clearly highlight the lack of consensus 
among the participating delegations throughout the negotiations as to whether an 
explicit reference to subcritical and computer simulated testing, and in fact testing 
in general, should be included within the TPNW. As such, the fact that the testing 
obligation under art 1(1)(a) remains open to some degree of interpretation comes 
as no surprise. Consequently, Casey-Maslen notes how the final provision 
incorporated within art 1(1)(a) reflected a ‘compromise’ for the participating 
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delegations,185 but at the same time he concedes that the final prohibition was 
‘narrower than a number of states had advocated’.186 This conclusion therefore 
suggests, at least implicitly, that the final testing prohibition, despite its alteration 
away from the wording of art I(1) of the CTBT, still remains limited to explosive 
testing, leaving both subcritical and computer simulated tests beyond the TPNW’s 
scope. 
At the same time, if complementarity with the CTBT were desired by the 
drafters — as suggested by President Whyte Gómez — there would have been no 
reason to move away from the 22 May draft prohibition on testing that precisely 
duplicated the pre-existing CTBT prohibition under art I(1). In other words, given 
that the testing prohibition under art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW represents a 
‘compromise’, as suggested by Casey-Maslen, it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that a conscious decision was reached amongst the negotiating states to 
move away from the narrower CTBT prohibition and instead incorporate a wider 
range of obligations. The fact that the negotiating delegations explicitly decided 
to alter the wording of testing prohibition from the initial 22 May draft text could 
therefore be said to be a reflection of the desire to include a broader obligation 
under art 1(1)(a). 
Yet, although this argument seems persuasive, it remains somewhat telling that 
despite calls by Ecuador and Brazil for the inclusion of an explicit prohibition on 
subcritical and computer simulated tests within the TPNW,187 ultimately no such 
prohibition was agreed upon and incorporated into the final treaty text. This stands 
in contrast to the explicit prohibition of subcritical and computer simulated tests, 
alongside other experimental activities, within the proposed (but now dormant) 
1997 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention.188  
Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW instead remains both imprecise and vague in 
comparison to the explicit prohibition included in the Model Nuclear Weapons 
Convention, which again alludes to the lack of consensus amongst the participating 
states. In other words, even if an expanded testing prohibition was desired by many 
states, this has been poorly reflected in the final prohibition under art 1(1)(a), 
leaving the precise extent of this obligation open to varying degrees of 
interpretation. 
Moreover, the subsequent practice of states, a further tool of treaty 
interpretation under art 31(3)(b) of the VCLT,189 similarly reflects the contrasting 
interpretations of the scope of the testing prohibition established by art 1(1)(a) of 
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the TPNW. Upon ratifying the TPNW, Cuba declared its interpretation of testing, 
claiming that ‘[t]he prohibition on the testing [of] nuclear weapons contained in 
Article 1(a) [sic] encompasses all forms of testing, including those performed 
using non-explosive methods such as subcritical testing and computer 
simulation’.190 A similar sentiment was expressed by Nigeria191 and, towards the 
end of the negotiations, Ecuador.192 At the same time, other states continued to 
express opposition to the inclusion of a testing prohibition altogether. Sweden, for 
example, noted its ‘strong preference not to have nuclear testing in this Treaty’,193 
while Switzerland referred to the prohibition as a ‘generic reference to nuclear 
testing’, suggesting that this clear lack of specificity may risk undermining the 
existing CTBT norm.194 Additionally, Kazakhstan argued during the final stages 
of negotiations that the TPNW ‘should have included subcritical testing’,195 and 
Iran wanted ‘all types of testing specifically prohibited’, according to one 
observer.196 
Overall, it seems apparent that the final text has resulted in a vague formulation 
of the prohibition on testing nuclear weapons that remains open to differing 
interpretations by states and commentators alike. Taking a more cautious 
perspective, it seems difficult to confirm with any certainty that non-explosive 
testing activities are captured under the testing prohibition established by  
art 1(1)(a). This, however, does not deprive the testing prohibition in the TPNW 
of value. On the contrary, given the current frailty of the CTBT, its failure to enter 
into force and recent suggestions by the US of non-compliance of Russia and 
China, the prohibition on nuclear explosive tests under the TPNW provides a 
welcome duplication of the CTBT prohibitions. Once in force, the testing 
prohibitions of the TPNW will establish an explicit legally binding prohibition for 
all states that ratify the Treaty. At the same time, one cannot help but feel 
somewhat underwhelmed by the lack of support for an explicit provision or 
reference banning all non-explosive tests under the wider ambit of the testing 
prohibition of art 1(1)(a). 
VI THE UNDERTAKING NEVER TO ‘DEVELOP’ NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TESTING OBLIGATIONS 
Despite the inconclusive and somewhat disappointing conclusion reached 
above regarding the extent of the testing prohibition under the TPNW, there 
remains a second way in which subcritical and computer simulated testing could 
potentially be captured by art 1(1)(a): through the undertaking never to ‘develop’ 
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nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Whereas the prohibition on 
‘testing’ certain weapons is generally a unique characteristic of nuclear 
weapons-related treaties,197 the prohibition of development is generally preferred 
in disarmament instruments prohibiting both chemical and biological weapons.198 
Despite this preference, the prohibition on developing nuclear weapons has not 
been incorporated consistently across different nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament instruments. The NPT prohibits NNWS from ‘manufactur[ing] or 
otherwise acquir[ing]’ nuclear weapons under art II, which only entails a narrow 
obligation covering the physical construction of a completed nuclear device.199 
Although not prohibiting development, the Treaty of Tlatelolco does prohibit the 
‘production’ of nuclear weapons.200 This term incorporates a broader scope than 
‘manufacturing’ and has been viewed as including ‘not only manufacture 
(ie production in a factory) but also local improvisation or adaption of 
weapons’.201 Yet, as with the concept of ‘manufacture’, this would again fail to 
encompass earlier developmental steps, instead alluding only to the latter stages 
of the construction process.202 
However, some NWFZ treaties contain an explicit prohibition on the 
development of nuclear weapons. Under art 3(a) of the Treaty of Pelindaba, states 
party are required ‘[n]ot to … develop [or] manufacture … any nuclear explosive 
device’.203 The TPNW essentially takes a ‘catch-all’ approach under art 1(1)(a) by 
establishing an undertaking never to ‘develop … produce, [or] manufacture … 
nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices’, thus following the formulation 
adopted in other conventional disarmament treaties such as the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
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Mines and on Their Destruction204 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.205 
While this level of detail may be considered both excessive and unnecessary, it 
creates a welcome degree of overlap between each of the aforementioned 
concepts, thus helping to avoid any possible loopholes or ways to work around the 
prohibitions of development-related activities included under art 1(1)(a) of the 
TPNW.206 
Like the term ‘test’, the term ‘develop’ remains undefined by disarmament 
treaties but is ordinarily understood as to ‘create or produce especially by 
deliberate effort over time’207 or ‘to invent something or bring something into 
existence’.208 This would seem to suggest that ‘[a]ll acts that amount to, or are 
directed towards, development of the weapon or its integral parts and components 
are prohibited’.209 This definition immediately alludes to a vast array of potential 
activities that could be captured by the notion of development. 
However, one preliminary matter relates to whether military ‘research’ into 
nuclear weapon-related technology would be captured under the auspices of the 
prohibition of development under art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW, despite its lack of 
explicit inclusion as an individual prohibition. In the present context, research is 
defined as ‘[t]he systematic investigation into and study of materials and sources 
in order to establish facts and reach new conclusions’.210 The TPNW distinguishes 
between permitted and prohibited research by preserving the ‘inalienable right of 
its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination’,211  thereby reaffirming the right 
afforded by art IV of the NPT.212 Walter Krutzsch similarly argues that the term 
‘develop’ under art I(1)(a) of the CWC encompasses ‘a number of steps for 
creating a functioning weapon ready for production, stockpiling, and use, as 
distinct from permitted research’,213 therefore envisioning the possibility of some 
research and development activities associated with chemical materials remaining 
permitted. As such, so long as research and development activities by a state party 
do not, in any way, contribute towards any military application or advancement of 
nuclear weapon systems, peaceful research remains permitted under the TPNW. 
However, given that individual prohibitions on both ‘research’ and 
‘develop[ment]’ have been included as separate, though undoubtedly 
interconnected and overlapping, prohibitions by the Treaty of Pelindaba and the 
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Treaty of Semipalatinsk,214 one may argue that both terms should be viewed as 
two separate actions operating in tandem, thereby suggesting a degree of 
autonomy between the two concepts. 215  This seems to be the view taken by 
Krutzsch, who suggests that the prohibition of development in the context of the 
CWC only encompasses activities ‘from an advanced stage onwards’ with a 
clearly ‘defined and recognizable purpose’. 216  Initial research activities may 
therefore be beyond the scope of the prohibition of development from this 
understanding, unless the purpose of such research would undermine the object 
and purpose of the TPNW. 
Other commentators provide an alternative approach. Casey-Maslen and 
Vestner, for instance, argue that the term ‘development’ ‘refers to the stage of 
research prior to formal production of the weapon in question’217 and, as a result, 
suggest that ‘[r]esearch forms an integral part of the international legal concept 
of development’.218 Therefore, despite the apparent autonomy associated with the 
terms ‘research’ and ‘development’, the authors here view ‘research’ as just one 
example of the numerous activities that fall within the wider ambit of 
‘development’. From this perspective, it can be reasonably argued that ‘[o]nce a 
state begins to develop a prohibited weapon, it violates that prohibition on 
development, irrespective of how advanced the design or research may be’.219 
In essence, the ‘temporality’ condition of an ‘advanced’ stage of development 
suggested by Krutzsch is not necessary. Such a temporal requirement would 
ultimately ‘conflate the content of the prohibition with the means and ease of 
verification of compliance’.220 Rather, as soon as any particular research activity 
can be regarded as having a military, as opposed to peaceful, purpose, such an 
activity would be prohibited by the broader notion of development. 
The travaux préparatoires of the TPNW would seem to demonstrate support 
for a wider construction of the term ‘develop’. First, during the TPNW 
negotiations, Austria considered ‘research’ and ‘design’ to be covered by the 
concept of development and warned that an explicit prohibition on research could 
unintentionally prohibit research into the peaceful application of nuclear energy 
and technology. 221  Similarly, the ICRC suggested that including similar 
prohibitions to art 1(1) of the CWC, which includes a prohibition on development 
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but not on research, ‘would suffice to achieve the purposes of the treaty to ban 
nuclear weapons’ and would be sufficiently ‘clear and robust’. 222  This 
understanding seemed to have been accepted, at least tacitly, as relatively little 
debate on the need for a separate prohibition on research activities followed 
thereafter. 223 Indeed, it is telling that Cuba, upon depositing its instrument of 
ratification, did not offer a comparable declaration clarifying the scope of the term 
‘develop’ as it had done in relation to the term ‘test’.224 
In light of this broader interpretation of the prohibition on development under 
the TPNW, there is a strong case that both subcritical and computer simulated tests 
would be prohibited by art 1(1)(a). First, as briefly noted above,225 non-explosive 
experiments would help enhance our understanding of how a newly developed or 
qualitatively improved existing nuclear weapon would operate under certain 
conditions, and therefore help ascertain the expected result of its use and affirm 
the reliability of current stockpiles.226 Both of these processes would undoubtedly 
constitute prohibited research experiments with the aim of ‘establish[ing] facts and 
reach[ing] new conclusions’227 as to the performance of both existing and newly 
designed nuclear explosive devices, contrary to both art 1(1)(a) and the underlying 
object and purpose of the TPNW as a whole. 
There is also support for the inclusion of non-explosive testing activities within 
the prohibition on development based upon statements issued during the 
negotiations. Ireland, for example, explicitly argued that the notion of 
‘development’ included in the TPNW text would encompass computer simulated 
tests.228  Chile similarly expressed early concern over the inclusion of ‘test 
explosion’ and instead called for ‘a broader interpretation [recognising] that there 
is a prohibition of any kind of development of nuclear weapons’. 229  Indeed, 
Casey-Maslen has argued that 
[t]hose opposing the explicit prohibition of subcritical nuclear testing were not 
seeking to prevent the 2017 Treaty from rendering the activity unlawful, but were 
concerned that the Treaty should remain consistent with the CTBT. But, as they 
argued, such subcritical testing is prohibited by the undertaking never under any 
circumstances to develop nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.230 
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Overall, given the broad interpretation and scope of activities covered under the 
prohibition of development, and considering the research-oriented nature of both 
subcritical and computer simulated testing, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
non-explosive testing activities would likely be captured by the wider ambit of the 
prohibition of development under art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW, thus closing the testing 
‘loophole’ established under the CTBT framework. Both activities are intended to 
improve a state’s understanding of how its nuclear weapons perform and help 
modify, and therefore develop, current nuclear weapons to extend their lifespan. 
This conclusion would also support the object and purpose of the TPNW in 
contributing towards, and ultimately achieving, nuclear disarmament. 
VII TPNW ENTRY-INTO-FORCE PROSPECTS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
CTBT 
Having determined that the TPNW prohibits subcritical and computer simulated 
nuclear weapons tests within the undertaking never to develop nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices in art 1(1)(a), the following offers some more 
pragmatic thoughts regarding the TPNW’s likelihood of entry into force, while 
briefly examining the future relationship between the testing prohibitions under 
the TPNW and CTBT. 
A Entry into Force 
The TPNW follows the trend of most other international treaties in terms of the 
requirements it sets for entry into force. In accordance with art 15(1), the TPNW 
‘shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited’. 231  The benefit of this 
simple 50-state threshold is twofold. First, and most significantly, the TPNW 
negotiators have sensibly avoided repeating the flaw present under art XIV(1) and 
annex 2 of the CTBT by removing any requirement for specific types or categories 
of states — such as the NWPS — ratifying the instrument before it is able to 
achieve entry into force. This will help ensure that the TPNW does not replicate 
the failures of the CTBT,232 thereby making certain that the attainment of entry 
into force is not held hostage to the whim of just a few states. 
Moreover, the benefits of this numerical threshold are made more obvious 
given the extensive opposition to the TPNW expressed by the NWPS and their 
strategic military allies. In July 2017, the UK, US and France issued a joint 
statement upon the adoption of the TPNW, which said: 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States have not taken part in the 
negotiation of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We do not intend 
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to sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore, there will be no change in the 
legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons.233 
This claim was repeated again in October 2018, this time with Russia and China 
joining in the statement.234 Russia has stated that the TPNW ‘is at variance with 
Russia’s national interests and … vision of movement towards a nuclear free 
world’.235 India has also voiced similar concerns.236 
Given this express opposition from the NWPS, the benefits of the simple 
numerical threshold of the TPNW — in contrast to the onerous requirements of 
art XIV(1) of the CTBT — become clear. While it would undoubtedly be desirable 
for the NWPS to support and eventually ratify the TPNW — particularly as these 
are the states most likely to conduct nuclear weapons tests —  the collective 
unwillingness of the NWPS to ratify the TPNW will not disrupt or undermine 
efforts to achieve its entry into force. On the contrary, at the very least, a 
substantial number of non-aligned NNWS that support the Treaty will be legally 
bound by the broader testing prohibitions it establishes and the variety of other 
obligations imposed by the TPNW. Quite simply, the TPNW has the potential to 
realise and achieve a legally binding nuclear testing prohibition much sooner than 
the CTBT. 
Secondly, the numerical threshold set by the TPNW affords a sufficient degree 
of credibility and helps demonstrate both the seriousness of the instrument and the 
international significance of the Treaty.237 Rather than setting a low standard that 
could easily be satisfied, the 50-state requirement sets almost a degree of 
challenge, which, if satisfied, will exemplify the legitimacy and widespread 
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support amongst states for the TPNW. Indeed, the threshold was raised from a 
lower 40-state requirement in the 22 May draft to the current threshold in the final 
text.238 At the same time, by not requiring the significantly higher number of 
ratifications of 80 states as suggested by Sweden,239 the TPNW ensures that its 
entry into force will not be overly delayed, which would risk dissipating support 
for the instrument. 
The prospects for entry into force in the near future seem very promising 
indeed. Key supporting states of the humanitarian initiative have already ratified 
the TPNW, including Mexico and Austria (the hosts of the latter two humanitarian 
conferences),240 South Africa (a former NWPS that unilaterally abandoned its 
own nuclear weapon programme in 1989)241 and other supporters such as New 
Zealand.242 As of 30 September 2020, 46 states have ratified the TPNW, the latest 
being Malaysia.243  
Furthermore, the TPNW is achieving a similar rate of ratification as other 
weapons of mass destruction disarmament instruments. The CWC opened for 
signature on 13 January 1993, yet it was not until the ratification by Cuba on  
29 April 1997, four years and three months after first opening for signature, that 
the CWC entered into force. 244  Similarly, the BWC opened for signature on  
10 April 1972, yet it was not until nearly three years later on 26 March 1975 that 
it achieved the 22 ratifications required for its entry into force.245 The TPNW, 
therefore, is achieving ratification at least at a comparable rate to other weapons 
of mass destruction disarmament instruments in force thus far. 
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Although some states present during the TPNW negotiations have since 
expressed an intention to not seek ratification of the Treaty as of yet,246 it seems 
probable that the TPNW will be ratified by at least the required 50 states. In fact, 
the art 15 threshold will easily be satisfied if just half of the states that voted in 
favour of the Treaty’s adoption decide to ratify the TPNW.247 Overall, prospects 
for the TPNW’s entry into force currently seem promising, and one can imagine 
that the Treaty will achieve legally binding status much sooner than the CTBT, 
thus imposing a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons test explosions 
and non-explosive activities for its states party. 
B Relationship with the CTBT 
Perhaps a more pressing matter is precisely how the TPNW will operate in 
relation to the CTBT and whether the new treaty actually poses a threat to the 
attainment of the CTBT’s entry into force and the full operationalisation of its 
verification and monitoring mechanisms discussed previously. Indeed, in voicing 
opposition to the adoption of the TPNW, some NWPS have claimed that the Treaty 
risks undermining the existing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament legal 
framework.248 The following seeks to explore and address the credibility of such 
concerns and determine whether the TPNW weakens the support and realisation of 
the CTBT regime. 
It is prudent to note that the drafters of the TPNW went to great lengths to ensure 
that the Treaty would complement and strengthen the existing nuclear weapons 
international legal framework. 249  The TPNW preamble makes this clear by 
emphasising the continued importance of the NPT as the ‘cornerstone of the 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime’250 and recognising the ‘vital 
importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification 
regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
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regime’.251 This makes it clear that the negotiators did not intend the TPNW to 
detract from existing nuclear weapons instruments but rather to build upon, 
reinforce and complement both the NPT and CTBT. 
 How the TPNW will interact with existing nuclear weapons instruments in 
practice has created greater contention. The issue itself is covered by art 18, which 
states: 
The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by 
States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are 
party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.252 
It became apparent during the 2017 Negotiation Conference that the 
relationship between the TPNW and the NPT specifically would create a point of 
contention among the negotiating states.253 The initial draft of this provision stated 
that ‘[t]his Convention does not affect the rights and obligations of the States 
Parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’.254  
This formulation received strong support from the Netherlands, who wanted to 
ensure that the new treaty would not undermine the existing obligations under the 
NPT.255 Further, they sought to clarify the initial draft provision’s ‘hierarchy of 
agreements’, making it clear that in any case of conflict between the terms of the 
TPNW and NPT, the NPT obligations would prevail.256 
However, it was feared that referencing the ‘rights’ of states party under the 
NPT might permit NWS to join the new treaty while retaining possession of their 
respective nuclear weapons.257 Daniel H Joyner, for example, notes how ‘[s]ome 
nuclear weapons states have for some time argued that the NPT gives them a 
“right” to possession and to further production and refinement of nuclear 
weapons’, an assertion he deems completely unsupported by the text of the 
NPT.258 Had the assertion of these states — that, by referencing ‘rights’, the NWS 
could accede to the TPNW whilst retaining nuclear weapons — been true, it would 
have certainly undermined the fundamental object and purpose of the TPNW in 
contributing towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the text 
proposed in the initial draft was overly narrow, focusing solely on how the TPNW 
and NPT would interact in practice, whilst remaining quiet on the TPNW’s 
potential relationship with other agreements, including the CTBT. 
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Consequently, both Joyner and some non-aligned NNWS called for the deletion 
of this article, arguing that its current form would leave room for ‘interpretive and 
implementation confusion’. 259  In the end, based on a proposal made by 
Malaysia260 and endorsed by the ICRC,261 draft art 19 was revised, incorporating 
the corresponding text of art 26(1) of the Arms Trade Treaty262 into art 18 as it 
was finally drafted. This allows states party to continue to respect and lawfully 
implement their obligations established by pre-existing disarmament treaties, 
including both the NPT and CTBT, but only insofar as they are ‘consistent with’, 
and therefore do not ‘supersede[,] those set out in the [TPNW]’.263 In other words, 
in situations where there is a conflict of obligations between instruments, 
the TPNW obligations will prevail. 
Newell Highsmith and Mallory Stewart have criticised this provision, arguing 
that it ‘subordinates the NPT to the [TPNW]’,264 a position that one could similarly 
apply in relation to the CTBT. Yet, in reality, art 18 simply reaffirms general rules 
of international law relating to treaties concerning the same subject matter. 
Articles 30(3) and (4) of the VCLT state that for parties to two instruments of the 
same subject matter, ‘the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions 
are compatible with those of the later treaty’.265 Article 18 of the TPNW essentially 
reflects this basic approach, thereby conforming to the lex posterior derogat priori 
general principle of international law,266 which the International Law Commission 
has confirmed ‘is at its strongest in regard to conflicting or overlapping provisions 
that are part of treaties that are institutionally linked or otherwise intended to 
advance similar objectives’.267 
Furthermore, this approach taken under art 18 of the TPNW is only logical and 
is indicative of the obligation of all states to perform their respective treaty 
commitments in good faith.268 Indeed, it would be counterintuitive if earlier, more 
limited obligations assumed under an existing treaty could prevail lex priori over 
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the more stringent prohibitions contained in art 1 of the TPNW. 269  Such an 
approach could even risk undermining the achievement of the TPNW’s object and 
purpose in achieving a nuclear weapon-free world and avoiding any future use of 
nuclear weapons, including for testing purposes. Instead, the general operation of 
the lex posterior principle through art 18 is ‘little more than a statement of 
common sense’, clarifying that the Treaty’s expansive obligations incorporated 
into art 1 cannot be derogated from by citing membership of a less restrictive 
nuclear weapons instrument as justification.270 
Given the conclusions reached in Parts IV and V, one can immediately identify 
a possible point of contention between the scope of the testing prohibitions under 
the narrower CTBT and the wider prohibitions within art 1(1)(a) of the TPNW.271 
Indeed, during the 2017 negotiations, the Arms Control Association raised 
concerns that including a prohibition of subcritical and computer simulated tests 
(albeit directly under the prohibition of testing rather than development) could 
‘reopen the issue of CTBT scope, and/or create a conflict with the CTBT’.272 
As such, the fact that the TPNW establishes a broader scope of obligation in 
relation to testing than the CTBT may prima facie suggest that a conflict of 
obligations exists between the two treaty regimes. 
At the same time, it can be argued that rather than creating a conflict of 
obligations or inconsistency, the TPNW in fact represents an ‘evolution’ of the 
pre-existing testing prohibition established by the CTBT. Indeed, one of the 
primary objectives of the TPNW is to strengthen and build upon pre-existing norms 
against nuclear weapons as a means of contributing towards nuclear disarmament 
and the elimination of all nuclear weapons. 273  The evolution of the testing 
prohibition, therefore, does not necessarily clash with the CTBT, but rather, 
it incorporates the pre-existing prohibition of all nuclear explosive tests and 
subsequently goes one step further by also encompassing non-explosive activities. 
Consequently, rather than perceiving the difference in obligation between the 
CTBT and TPNW as an inconsistency or subordination as a result of the operation 
of art 18 of the TPNW, the broader testing prohibition of the TPNW should be 
conceived as a necessary, complementary and timely evolution in pursuit of 
nuclear disarmament. 
Despite this suggestion of an evolutional relationship between the CTBT and 
TPNW, a question does remain: given that the TPNW establishes a broader testing 
prohibition, are there any reasons why the CTBT’s entry into force should still be 
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pursued? In other words, does the simpler entry-into-force requirement and 
broader scope of the testing prohibition under the TPNW risk detracting from the 
CTBT? There are certainly some grounds for concern here. Marco Pedrazzi, for 
example, has noted the issue that states may be induced to ratify the TPNW either 
without ratifying the CTBT or by withdrawing their signature from the CTBT.274 
Switzerland also suggests that the TPNW testing prohibition may risk further 
delaying the entry into force of the CTBT and may threaten to prevent the 
realisation of its extensive verification and monitoring framework.275  Other 
commentators have similarly argued that the adoption of the TPNW may 
encourage ‘forum shopping’,276 whereby states decide to ratify the TPNW while 
‘opting out’ of existing instruments, including the NPT and CTBT. In essence, the 
adoption of the TPNW offers states the potential to choose between the different 
instruments currently in operation277 and risks further fragmentation of the nuclear 
disarmament framework. 
However, this argument neglects three key points. First, no state has currently 
expressed an intention to leave existing nuclear disarmament treaties, including 
the CTBT, in favour of the TPNW.278 On the contrary, and as previously noted, 
numerous states have regularly argued that the TPNW will complement the 
existing regulatory structure.279  In fact, ban supporters frequently urge the 
remaining annex 2 states to ratify the CTBT as a matter of urgency.280 Moreover, 
should any NNWS decide to withdraw from either the NPT or CTBT, it is unlikely 
that the TPNW will be the ‘sole or even primary trigger for such developments’.281 
Rather, it would likely be other reasons, such as frustration with the slow pace of 
disarmament and the inequality of the NPT, amongst other factors, which may lead 
NNWS to withdraw from existing commitments. 
Secondly, and as noted previously, the TPNW preamble recognises the ‘vital 
importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification 
regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
regime’.282 This clearly emphasises an intention of the negotiators to recognise the 
vital importance of achieving the CTBT’s entry into force and the 
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operationalisation of its extensive verification framework. In no way could the 
adoption of the TPNW therefore be considered a move against the CTBT. In fact, 
verifying compliance with the explosive testing prohibition under art 1(1)(a) of 
the TPNW can only occur in conjunction with the CTBT monitoring framework. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the CTBT has not yet entered into force 
due to the reluctance of the annex 2 ‘hold out’ states to ratify the agreement.283 
Of these hold out states, six are current NWPS, with the DPRK, India and Pakistan 
not having even signed the CTBT thus far.284 Yet significantly, these very same 
hold out states are the ones expressing the greatest opposition to the TPNW. 
By contrast, and as noted above, the majority of non-aligned NNWS that 
supported the TPNW have already ratified the CTBT and have not indicated an 
intention to withdraw from the CTBT. As such, it is not the non-aligned NNWS 
that pose a threat to the future of the CTBT but rather the hold out NWPS, 
which are equally against the TPNW as they are against ratifying the CTBT.285 
Consequently, it seems that the growth of support for the TPNW will not 
discourage efforts to promote CTBT entry into force and instead may provide 
additional reinforcement to the CTBT, which is held hostage by the remaining 
annex 2 states. 
Overall, there is clear reason to believe that the effect of art 18 of the TPNW 
will allow the TPNW to harmoniously reinforce the CTBT without undermining 
the associated verification benefits gained from the CTBT’s entry into force.  
The broader testing prohibitions established by the TPNW simply expand upon 
and are an evolution of the earlier obligations under art I(1) of the CTBT. Yet this 
by no means replaces the importance of achieving the CTBT’s ratification, 
especially to realise the full operation of the CTBT’s extensive verification and 
monitoring framework discussed earlier. In addition, no TPNW-supporting NNWS 
has expressed any indication that the TPNW is viewed as a replacement of the 
CTBT; in fact, the only reason that the CTBT’s entry into force has been delayed 
is due to the lack of ratification by the NWPS and certain NNWS annex 2 states 
such as Egypt. In effect, the TPNW represents an additional layer of support to the 
prohibitions established by the CTBT and other obligations assumed elsewhere, 
thereby complementing existing testing prohibitions for present purposes. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The adoption of the TPNW offers a welcome reinforcement of the international 
testing prohibition regime and helps complement the increasingly strained CTBT. 
The entry into force of the CTBT would of course represent a truly welcome 
development for current efforts towards nuclear disarmament, allowing the 
operation of the CTBTO verification framework as well as confirming a legally 
binding prohibition on all forms of testing. Yet pending such an event, the more 
achievable entry into force of the TPNW will provide various other benefits. 
First, it will create a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapon test explosions, 
reflecting the prohibitions under art I(1) of the CTBT, which are not legally binding 
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pending entry into force.286 Secondly, the TPNW will close the ‘loophole’ of the 
CTBT by prohibiting subcritical and computer simulated testing and thus impose 
broader, more restrictive obligations upon future states party. This clearly helps 
advance the object and purpose of both the TPNW and the CTBT in preventing 
nuclear proliferation and contributing towards nuclear disarmament. 
Finally, the benefits of the TPNW are not wholly deprived of value in light of 
the opposition expressed by the NWPS thus far. At a minimum, upon entry into 
force, the TPNW will impose legally binding prohibitions of all forms of nuclear 
weapon testing upon its states party, the majority of whom will likely be NNWS. 
This will at least reaffirm the norm against nuclear non-proliferation and reinforce 
the growing norm and taboo against nuclear weapon testing. Although the NWPS 
remain the primary ‘targets’ of a testing prohibition, it would be incorrect to 
deprive the TPNW of any meaning whatsoever, particularly as these states may, in 
the distant future, become more amenable to ratifying the ban treaty. In addition, 
the evolution of the nuclear weapon testing prohibition by no means detracts from 
the continued importance of achieving the CTBT’s entry into force in order to 
realise the full potential benefits of its extensive verification framework. As such, 
the TPNW does not attempt to replace the CTBT, as many of the supporters of the 
Treaty and its preamble emphasise, but rather seeks to reinforce efforts to prohibit 
nuclear testing in a harmonious manner. 
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